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INTRODUCTION

According to a recent study by the General Accounting Office,
foreign-originated trades represented more than one-third of all
cases of suspected insider trading referred to the United States Securities and Exchange Commission in 1987. The same study indicated that foreign trading in U.S. equity markets has increased
dramatically over recent years, totalling almost half a trillion dollars in 1987 or 18% of the total dollar value of all trades in this
country.2
1. See Problems With the SEC's Enforcement of the Securities Laws as to Suspicious
Foreign Originated Trader"Hearingsbefore the Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer, and
Monetary Affairs of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess.
(1988) [hereinafter Hearings] (opening statements of Hon. Douglas Bernard, Jr. and Gary
Montjoy).
2. See i
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The globalization of the securities markets has led to a growing concern about the SEC's ability to police trades originating
from abroad.3 Although the SEC has been mindful of the need to
prevent illicit foreign-originated trading, the central problem the
Commission faces in this area is the collection of foreign-based evidence, i.e., when evidence is located and controlled outside the
U.S., the Commission must often defer to and work within the jurisdiction of another sovereign nation.4
This Comment assesses the effectiveness of the various alternatives available to the SEC for obtaining evidence from abroad. In
order to provide a more objective assessment, Section II examines
briefly the historical background of the problems associated with
transnational discovery. The discussion in Section III explores in
detail the various problems the SEC encounters when it attempts to
obtain evidence from abroad under the federal securities laws; it
also explores the problems that arise when the SEC attempts to
obtain evidence which is subject to foreign secrecy laws or blocking
statutes. 5 In Section IV, this Comment examines the Commission's
experience with the various international agreements for the production of evidence. Finally, the concluding discussion in Section
V suggests that the most efficient alternative for obtaining evidence
from abroad in cases involving illicit foreign-originated trading is
not through unilateral judicial action by the U.S., but through diplomatic initiatives which serve to increase international cooperation
among governments and their respective regulatory authorities.
3. See id.; see also U.S.

SECURITIES

AND

NATIONALIZATION OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS,

EXCHANGE

COMMISSION,

INTER-

ch. I (1987); see generally sources cited

infra note 18.
4. See Hearings cited supra note I (testimony of David S. Ruder, Chairman, U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission); see also M. MANN AND J. MARI, DEVELOPMENTS
IN INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES LAW ENFORCEMENT (1989).
5. American litigants conducting discovery abroad may be adversely affected by
official foreign acts. Generally, these include antisuit injunctions (orders from one court
directing a party not to seek relief in another court or not to comply with orders of another
court); blocking statutes (legislative enactments by foreign governments prohibiting
distribution of sensitive information); secrecy laws (legislative rights given to individuals
which allow them to require others to maintain specific information secret). For a more
detailed discussion of the foregoing procedures and their effect on recent discovery efforts
by the Commission, see M. MANN AND J. MARI, DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAl.
SECURITIES LAw ENFORCEMENT 42-47 (1989).
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II.

TRANSNATIONAL DISCOVERY IN PERSPECTIVE

After World War II, industrial nations experienced a dramatic
increase in international trade.' Not surprisingly, this increase in
transnational trade resulted in occasional disagreements which invariably ended up in court.' Unfortunately, the intricacies of international law were not understood by the American bar in the early
part of this century.' This misunderstanding created obstacles for
Americans attempting to obtain evidence from abroad.9
The primary obstacle in transnational discovery continues to
be the concept of territorial sovereignty, i.e., although the United
States and the other nations affected by a case may be friendly allies, they remain separate universal states which, having not yielded
sovereignty to one central government or pledged full faith and
credit to the judicial proceedings of each other, expect justice to be
accomplished through their own respective judicial systems."0 In
order to understand the roots of this conflict, the theories and values underlying judicial procedure in civil law countries must be
examined.
In civil law countries, a fundamental precept is that the professionalism of the judiciary secures procedural justice." The skill
and experience of the judge in evaluating evidence is considered
most likely to lead to the "truth."' 2 The American discovery process - gathering voluminous quantities of factual information by
attorneys who are then free to present or not to present such information and to manipulate its presentation to serve their own ends
-

3
is generally distrusted.'

Another fundamental precept of judicial procedure in civil law
6. Weis, The Federal Rules and the Hague Conventions: Concerns of Conformity and

Comity, 50 U. Parr. L. REv. 903 (1989).
7. See id. at 903.
8. See id

9. See id.
10. Oxman, The Choice Between Direct Discovery and Other Means of Obtaining
Evidence Abroad: The Impact of the Hague Evidence Convention, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV.
733, 744 (1983).
11. See Gerber, ExtraterritorialDiscovery and the Conflict of Procedural Systems:
Germany and the United States, 34 AM. J. COMP. L. 745, 768 (1986).

12. See id. at 768.
13. See id
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countries is that the litigation process should resolve disputes with
maximum dispatch, with minimum interference of private rights,
and with minimum costs to society. '4 "Accordingly, the state is not
allowed to interfere with privacy rights or to impose burdens on
private citizens for the sake of [resolving] a private conflict unless
there is a reasonable basis for believing that the result of such use of
state power will be significant."' 5
Hence, the problems that Americans experience when attempting to obtain evidence from abroad in civil litigation emanate
not only from the different historical concepts of procedural justice
among civil and common law nations, but also from the different
values attached to those concepts. 16 Stated differently, procedures
that are fundamental to fairness in the United States, e.g., adversary and full disclosure principles, if imposed on another sovereign
state, might violate its fundamental notions of justice and fairness.
Consequently, when American discovery rules are sought to be applied outside of the United States, a direct confrontation usually
arises between the values and theories underlying the different systems of procedural justice. This confrontation gives rise to many of
the problems discussed below.
III.

DISCOVERY OBLIGATIONS OF A FOREIGN PARTY OR
WITNESS SUBJECT TO U.S. JURISDICTION

The purpose of the discussion in this Section is to examine the
problems that arise when the SEC attempts to obtain evidence from
a foreign source which, although subject to U.S. jurisdiction, may
be allowed or even required by foreign law to not cooperate with
the Commission.' 7 It is not within the scope of this Comment to
examine issues related to the extraterritorial application of U.S. jurisdiction under the federal securities laws.' Rather, the discus14. See id
15. See iL at 769.
16. See id ; see also Jones, International Judicial Assistance: Procedural Chaos and a
Programfor Reform, 62 YALE L.J. 515 (1953).
17. See supra note 5.
18. For a comprehensive discussion of arguments both in favor and against liberal
application of extraterritorial jurisdiction under the federal securities laws, see Note,
American Adjudication of Transnational Securities Fraud, 89 HARV. L. REV. 553 (1976);
Comment, Extraterritorial Application of United States Commodity and Securities Laws to
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sion in this Section focuses on the conflicts which the SEC
experiences in transnational discovery after U.S. jurisdiction has
been determined to exist.
A.

Analytical Framework

In Societe Internationale Pour ParticipationsIndustrielles et
Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers,'9 the Supreme Court addressed, inter

alia, the issue of what, if any, sanctions are appropriate against a
party who fails to produce foreign-based records. In that case, the
defendant filed a request for production of documents under Rule

34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The request was
blocked, however, because the Swiss government, pursuant to a ruling by a Swiss Court stating that such disclosure would violate

Swiss Penal Law, "constructively" seized the records which were
actually being held in a Swiss bank.
Despite the action of the Swiss government, the United States
Supreme Court held that, although the documents had been "constructively" confiscated by foreign government authorities, the
plaintiff had actual control of the documents and was, thus, required to respond to the request for production. 20 However, the
Court softened the impact of its holding by stating that, in the ab-

sence of bad faith,2 ' U.S. courts could not employ the ultimate
sanction of dismissal with prejudice, but instead could use sanctions that would only offset any evidentiary advantage attained by

the foreign litigant by reason of foreign law.22
The Restatement (Second) 23 of the Foreign Relations Law of
Aarket Transactions in an Age of Intercontinental Trading Links, 7 Nw. J. INT'L L. &
Bus. 351 (1985); Comment, The TransnationalReach of Rule lOb-5, 121 U. PA. L. REV.
1363 (1973). For a perspective from abroad, see Hacking, The Increasing Extraterritorial
Impact of U.S. Laws: A Casefor Concern Amongst FriendsofAmerica, I Nw. J. INT'L L. &
Bus. 1 (1979).
19. 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
20. See id. at 211.
21. See id. at 212.
22. See id.at 213.
23. The American Law Institute has replaced the Restatement (Second) with the
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1987) [hereinafter
Restatement (Third)]. The Restatement (Third) has been criticized for departing from the
comity approach of the Restatement (Second) and for establishing strict, exhaustive, and
unpredictable standards for the exercise of U.S. jurisdiction. See Goelzer, Stillman, Walter,
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the United States (1965) [hereinafter Restatement (Second)] provides additional criteria for ascertaining the discovery obligations
of a party, or a witness, subject to U.S. jurisdiction. Section 39 of
the Restatement (Second) states that the mere existence of a foreign
law which presents a conflict in an area of concurrent jurisdiction
does not divest one state of jurisdiction. Instead, as set out in Section 40, both states must consider various factors when they exercise jurisdiction in areas where conflicts may arise. These factors
include:
a. vital national interests of each of the states;
b. the extent and nature of the hardships that inconsistent enforcement actions would impose upon the person;
c. the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in
the territory of the other state;
d. the nationality of the person; and
e. the extent to which enforcement by action of either state can
reasonably be expected to achieve compliance with the rule
prescribed by that state.
B.

The Diverse Evolution of the Case Law

The case law has focused on the first two factors of Section 40
of the Restatement (Second) as well as on the badfaith factor discussed in Rogers. For instance, in In re Grand Jury Proceedings,
United States v. The Bank of Nova Scotia,24 the District Court for
the Southern District of Florida found the defendant/bank in civil
contempt for failing to adequately produce documents pursuant to
a subpoena." The court, therefore, levied a fine which ultimately
accrued to $1,825,000.26 On appeal, the bank argued that, with reSullivan, Michael, The Draft Revised Restatement. A CritiqueFrom a Securities Regulation
Perspective, 19 INT'L LAW. 431 (1985); see also Letter from the U.S. Attorney General to
the American Law Institute (Nov. 26, 1985).
In view of the criticism which the Restatement (Third) has received, it is still an open
question whether the courts will abandon the approach of the Restatement (Second), and
its precedent, in favor of the Restatement (Third). See, e.g., AVC Nederland B.V. v.
Atrium Investment Partnership, 740 F.2d 148, 150 (2d Cir. 1984); see also Laker Airways,
Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 950 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (stating that the
proposed criteria of the Restatement (Third) would delay international discovery requests).
24. 740 F.2d 817 (11th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1106 (1985).
25. See id at 819.
26. See id
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spect to the documents in the Cayman Islands, sanctions should
not have been levied against it because compliance with the subpoena would have required the bank to violate the bank secrecy
laws of the Cayman Islands.27
The Eleventh Circuit rejected the argument and concluded
that, in light of Section 40 of the Restatement (Second), the interest
of the Cayman Islands in bank secrecy could not outweigh the interest of the United States in prosecuting criminal transactions.28
Moreover, the court observed that the bank had chosen to operate
in two jurisdictions with inconsistent laws and must, therefore, be
29
willing to suffer the consequences of conflicting judicial demands.
A different judicial approach to a case with facts similar to
those of Bank of Nova Scotia is found in In re Sealed Case." In
that case, the District Court for the District of Columbia found a
bank, owned by the government of country X and a manager of a
branch of that bank in country Y, in contempt for failing to respond to a grand jury subpoena.3 Both the bank and the manager
argued that responding to the subpoena not only would violate the
secrecy laws of country Y, but also would subject both the bank
and the manager to criminal prosecution in country Y. 32 The Circuit Court for the District of Columbia reversed the contempt finding as to the bank.3 3
Unlike the ruling of the Eleventh Circuit in Bank of Nova Scotia, the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia in In re Sealed
Case found, inter alia, that the defendant/bank could not be compelled to violate the laws of country Y. The court identified two
important factors for reversing the civil contempt order against the
bank. First, it stated that "these sanctions represent an attempt by
an American court to compel a foreign person to violate the laws of
a different foreign sovereign on that sovereign's own territory."3 4
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

See
See
See
825
See
See
See
See

id. at 825.
id. at 827.
id.at 831-32.
F.2d 494 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 451 (1987).
id. at 495.
id.at 495-96.
id.at 499.
id. at 497.
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Second, the court stated that the bank "is not itself the focus of the
criminal investigation in this case but is a third party that has not
been accused of any wrong doing.""
Two additional cases illustrate the reasoning of U.S. courts
which are requested to compel production of foreign-based evi36
dence. These cases are SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana
(hereinafter the BSI case) and SEC v. Tome." In the BSI case, the
SEC, in an effort to learn a bank customer's identity, moved for an
order to compel discovery under Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.3 The bank countered by arguing that such disclosure would subject the bank to civil and criminal liability in Switzerland for violating Swiss secrecy laws.3 9 After a hearing, the
District Court for the Southern District of New York granted the
SEC's motion.'
The opinion of the court in BSI is significant for several reasons. First, the court noted that, under Rogers, a foreign law
prohibiting discovery is not decisive of how a U.S. court must rule
on a motion for an order to compel discovery.4" Second, the court
emphasized that the bank in BSI had acted in bad faith. 2 Third,
the court balanced the factors of Section 40 of the Restatement
(Second) and found that the bank had made deliberate use of Swiss
nondisclosure laws to evade U.S. securities laws on insider trading." In this regard, the court stated:
The strength of the United States' interest in enforcing its securities laws to ensure the integrity of its financial markets cannot
seriously be doubted. That interest is being continually
thwarted by the use of foreign accounts. Congress, in enacting
legislation on bank record-keeping, expressed its concern over
the problem over a decade ago: 'Secret foreign bank accounts
35. See id at 498.
36. 92 F.R.D. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).

37. 638 F. Supp. 596 ($.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd, 833 F.2d 1086 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied
sub. nom., Lombardfin v. SEC, 108 S. Ct. 1751 (1988).
38. See BSI, 92 F.R.D. at 113.
39. See id
40. See id.at 119.
41. See id. at 114.
42. See id at 118-19.
43. See id at 114-17.
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and secret foreign financial institutions have permitted the

proliferation of "white collar" crime . . . [and] have allowed
Americans and others to avoid the law and regulations concern-

ing securities and exchanges .... ' The debilitating effects of the
use of these secret institutions on ... the American economy are
vast .... 44
As a result of the information the SEC discovered in the BSI
case, the SEC brought successful insider trading cases against several foreigners, including Guisepppe Tome.45 In SEC v. Tome,4 6
the court found that Tome, an Italian securities professional with
substantial business ties to the U.S., had used a confidential relationship with Edgar Bronfman, the chairman and chief executive
officer of Seagrams, to obtain and misuse material, nonpublic information concerning the planned takeover bid of St. Joe Minerals
Corporation by Seagrams 7 Based upon this nonpublic, material
information, Tome and others bought large quantities of call options and common stock of St. Joe Minerals Corporation the day
before the bid was announced.48 The purchase orders were placed
by the Swiss bank in the BS[ case and were executed through foreign brokerage accounts maintained in the names of three Panamanian entities in which Tome had a beneficial interest.49 Failure to
grant the SEC's motion to compel discovery in the BSI case would
perhaps have allowed Tome's illicit foreign-originated trading to go
undetected.
In summary, the evolution of the international discovery cases
demonstrates a tendency by the courts to scrutinize the peculiar
facts of each case. The outcome is generally unpredictable 0 and
differs from case to case, e.g., in Bank of Nova Scotia, the Eleventh
Circuit concluded that the interests of the United States in enforc44. See id. at 117.
45. See M.

MANN AND J. MARl, DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES

LAw ENFORCEMENT 32 (1989).

46. Tome, 638 F. Supp. 596.
47. Id. at 599.
48. See id.
49. See &L at 608.
50. Cf Note, Court Ordered Violations of Foreign Bank Secrecy and Blocking Laws:
Solving the ExtraterritorialDilemma, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 563 ("Flaws in the current legal
approaches have led to ad hoc balancing and frequent questionable findings of bad faith.").

BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1:29

ing its laws outweighed the interests of the Cayman Islands in enforcing its secrecy laws; on the other hand, in In re Sealed Case, a
case with facts very similar to those of Bank of Nova Scotia, the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia concluded that the
interests of the United States did not justify compelling a foreign
bank to violate the banking secrecy laws of a foreign country.
These cases reflect the great uncertainty the SEC faces when it attempts to obtain foreign-based evidence in civil litigation.
More importantly, however, these cases highlight the need for
greater diplomatic initiatives among international securities regulatory authorities in order to bridge the span of obtaining evidence
from countries which have different values and theories underlying
their respective procedural justice systems. The remainder of this
Comment examines the diplomatic initiatives utilized by the SEC
and considers whether these initiatives have improved the SEC's
ability to obtain evidence from abroad.
IV.

DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES FOR THE PRODUCTION OF
FOREIGN-BASED EVIDENCE

As discussed above, conflicting state policies among the sovereign nations of the world often produce gridlock and uncertainty in
the gathering of evidence from abroad. During the last several
years, however, the SEC has successfully used international agreements for the production of evidence in order to discover and settle
several of the most significant insider trading cases in the Commission's history."
A.

Bilateral Treaties

The United States has entered into bilateral treaties which provide for mutual assistance in criminal actions with Switzerland, the
Netherlands, Turkey, and Italy.5 2 It has also signed, but not yet
ratified, bilateral agreements with the Commonwealth of the Baha51. See infra note 77 and accompanying text. See generally M. MANN AND J. MARl,
CURRENT ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES LAW ENFORCEMENT (1988).
52. See M. MANN AND J. MARI, DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES
LAW ENFORCEMENT 47 (1989).
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mas, Colombia, Morocco, Canada, and the Cayman Islands.53 To
illustrate the advantages and disadvantages of these agreements,
the following discussion focuses on the Swiss Treaty as it has served
as a model for the negotiation of similar arrangements with other
countries.
OPERATION, INTERPRETATION, AND EXPERIENCE UNDER THE
SWISS TREATY IN INSIDER TRADING CASES

The operative provisions of the Swiss Treaty,54 which are relevant to civil discovery by the SEC, are found in Articles 3 and 5.
Article 3 of the Swiss Treaty provides that the state granting assistance may refuse cooperation to the extent that the request is likely
to prejudice its sovereignty, security or similar essential interests.
Not surprisingly, banking secrecy under the Swiss Treaty is usually
considered an essential Swiss interest. However, unless the person
about whom the information is sought is unconnected with the offense, or the secret itself is of special importance to the Swiss economy, assistance generally will be forthcoming under the Treaty."
Article 5 of the Swiss Treaty provides that any evidence obtained pursuant to the Treaty, unless otherwise agreed by diplomatic channels, must be used in a criminal proceeding before it can
be introduced in a civil proceeding. Additionally, assistance may
also be denied if the purpose of the request is to prosecute a person
for acts for which he has already been acquitted in the requested
state. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Swiss Treaty is
available for assistance only in cases that violate the criminal laws
of both the U.S. and Switzerland.56
In 1982, the SEC made its first request under the Swiss Treaty
in SEC v. Certain Unknown Purchasersof Common Stock of and
Call Optionsfor the Common Stock of Santa Fe InternationalCor53. See id
54. Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Between the Swiss Confederation
and the United States, May 25, 1976, 27 U.S.T. 2019 (effective 1977).
55. See infra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
56. Because, prior to July 1, 1988, Switzerland had no insider trading law, the dual
criminality factor of the Swiss Treaty had created occasional discovery problems for the
SEC. However, the recently enacted insider trading law of Switzerland solves most, if not

all, of the SEC's former problems as it provides for substantial discovery in cases of insider
trading which originate through Swiss banks. See Swiss PENAL CODE ART. 161 (1988).
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poration5 7 (hereinafter the Santa Fe case). In Santa Fe, the SEC
sought to learn the identities of certain account holders who had
directed purchases of Santa Fe International Corporation stock and
options through Swiss banks immediately prior to the announcement of a merger. The Swiss Federal Court ruled that requests by
the SEC could be processed under the Swiss Treaty, even though
the SEC did not have the authority to bring criminal prosecutions.5 As grounds for its decision, the Swiss Court reasoned that
the requests of the SEC were in furtherance of an investigation and
in advance of a possible criminal referral.
Despite its ruling, the Swiss Court concluded that the SEC
had failed to allege the requisite violations of Swiss law and denied
the SEC's evidentiary request.5 9 Nevertheless, the opinion of the
Court left open an avenue for a second request when it stated that,
although an "insider" could trade while in possession of nonpublic
information,' purchase of stock by a "tippee" would violate Swiss
law. Accordingly, the SEC, on July 27, 1983, alleged the necessary
additional facts.
After all appeals were exhausted by the defendants, the Swiss
Federal Court ruled that the SEC's second request met the adequate requirements under the Swiss Treaty, and the identities of the
unknown purchasers were finally revealed to the Commission. As
a result of this ruling, the SEC, on February 26, 1986, disgorged
approximately eight million dollars in profits from the previously
unknown defendants. 6 ' Since the Santa Fe case, the Swiss Federal
Court has, on numerous occasions, affirmed the ability of the SEC
to use the Swiss Treaty for investigations involving, among other
things, insider trading.6 2
Nevertheless, bilateral treaties pose several disadvantages to
the SEC's efforts in obtaining foreign-based evidence. First, bilat57. 81 Civ. 6553 (WCC) (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 1981).
58. Opinion of the Supreme Court of Switzerland Concerning Judicial Assistance in
the Santa Fe Case, 22 I.L.M. 785 (1983).
59. See id.
60. But see supra note 56.
61. See M. MANN AND J. MARI, DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES
LAw ENFORCEMENT 53 (1989).

62. See id at 53.
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eral treaties require a lengthy negotiation and ratification process.6 3
Second, evidentiary requests are usually not processed expeditiously. Third, as the Santa Fe case demonstrates, bilateral treaties
usually are not tailored to the specific needs of the SEC and, consequently, consume enormous quantities of the Commission's
resources.
B.

The SEC's Experience Under the Hague Evidence Convention
The United States" and several other countries6" are con-

tracting states to the Hague Evidence Convention66 (hereinafter the
Convention). The Convention contains three of the most common
devices for discovery of foreign-based evidence in transnational litigation: letters rogatory, evidence-taking by consular officials, and

evidence-taking by appointed commissioners.67 However, the internal foreign restrictions on the gathering of evidence, by all but four
of the contracting states, have presented obstacles to the use of the
63. See id at 61.
64. For a practical discussion of the procedures involved in processing foreign evidence
requests in the United States under the Hague Evidence Convention, see Weiner, In Search
of InternationalEvidence: A Lawyer's Guide Through the United States Department of
Justice, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 60 (1982). For a pragmatic exposition of the procedures
for the processing of evidence requests of American litigants in foreign countries, see
Augustine, Obtaining InternationalJudicial Assistance Under the Federal Rules and the
Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil and CommercialMatters: An
Exposition of the Procedures and A Practical Example: In Re Westinghouse Uranium
Litigation, 10 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 102 (1980).
65. The following countries are parties to the Hague Evidence Convention: Barbados,
Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg,
Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Sweden, United Kingdom, and
United States. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORcE 318 (1988).

66. Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial
Matters, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444, 847
U.N.T.S. 231. It is outside the scope of this Comment to look deeply into the purpose or
evolution of the Convention. For such a discussion, see Oxman, The Choice Between Direct
Discovery and Other Means of Obtaining Evidence Abroad: The Impact of the Hague
Evidence Convention, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV. 733 (1983). For an insightful look into the
differing opinions of the various signatory countries regarding the purpose of the
Convention, see Amici Curiae Briefs filed by France, Germany, Great Britain and Northern
Ireland, Switzerland, United States and the Securities and Exchange Commission, Societe
Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States District Court for the Southern
District of Iowa, 107 S.Ct. 2542 (1987) (No. 85-1695) (LEXIS, Genfed library, S. Ct.
Briefs file).
67. See id.chs. 1-II.
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Convention by the SEC.68
For instance, in England, which has 3ne of the most liberal
enabling provisions" under the Convention, internal restrictions direct courts to narrow discovery requests to specific documents. In
addition, these internal restrictions allow the Secretary of State to
abrogate cooperation for state security reasons. Thus, in Rio Tinto
Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,7° the House of Lords
refused to give any effect to language used in a request which it
considered to be of a style routinely used in American discovery
request, e.g., produce any and all memoranda, correspondence, or
other documents relevant to this proceeding; the House of Lords
referred to the request as a "fishing expedition."
However, in 1989, the House of Lords, in In Re State of Nor71
way, found, inter alia, 2 that a letter of request, which had been
modified during the appeal process, could not be rejected as a "fishing expedition," as it was "in substance a request for what, by Eng'73
lish law, would be regarded as assistance in obtaining evidence.
The decision in this case provides substantial support for the position that requests under the Convention can be drafted in a manner
to avoid being labelled "fishing expeditions."
Despite In Re State of Norway and despite the fact that the
SEC has generally obtained the evidence it has requested pursuant
to the Convention, the expense and time expended by the Commission to obtain foreign-based evidence under the Convention has
been substantial. 74 Therefore, whenever possible, the SEC has de68. See M.

MANN AND J. MARl, DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES

LAW ENFORCEMENT 73 (1989).
69. See Evidence Act (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions), 1975, ch. 34.

70. 1 All E.R. 434 (1978).
71. 2 W.L.R. 458 (1989) (Goff, M.R.).
72. The House of Lords decision also stands for the propositions that U.K. courts will
consider an SEC proceeding a "civil or commercial" matter under the Convention. See id.
at 471-75 (stating that the term "civil or commercial" matter under the Convention should
be construed by reference to the respective laws of both countries in the evidentiary
proceeding and that an English court should be prepared to accept the statement of
the requesting court that the evidence which is required is for the purpose of a civil
proceeding).
73. Id at 479.
74. See M. MANN AND J. MARl, DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL SECURmES
LAW ENFORCEMENT 73 (1989).
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ferred" to the use of bilateral treaties, to memoranda of under-

standing, or, where appropriate, to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.7 6 The discussion that follows demonstrates that, of the

foregoing alternatives, the memoranda of understanding, when
combined with other diplomatic initiatives,77 provide the SEC with

the most expedient and least costly alternative for obtaining foreign-based evidence.
C. Memoranda of UnderstandingBetween the SEC and Foreign
Governments or Authorities

A memorandum of understanding (hereinafter MOU) is a
nonbinding agreement between international financial regulators.78
75. The ability of the SEC to defer to other international discovery alternatives was
validated in Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States District Court
for the Southern District of Iowa, 107 S. Ct. 2542 (1987) (holding, inter alia, that the
Convention is not the exclusive means for obtaining evidence located within the territory of
a signatory country and that the Convention does not require that its procedures be utilized
first). "The SEC, as amicus, opposed both the exclusivity and [the] first use requirement
because, among other reasons, its experience has shown that resort to the Hague
Convention's procedures can be costly and time consuming." M. MANN AND J. MARI,
DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL SECURmIES LAW ENFORCEMENT 74 (1989). For a
detailed presentation of the arguments of the United States and the SEC in Aerospatiale,see
Amici Curiae Brief for the United States and the Securities and Exchange Commission,
Aerospatiale, 107 S.Ct. 2542 (1987) (LEXIS, Genfed library, S. Ct. Briefs file).
Recently, however, scholars have suggested an "analytical model" which facilitates as
well as reduces the cost of obtaining evidence from abroad under the Convention. See
Youngblood & Welsh, ObtainingEvidence Abroad: A Model for Defining and Resolving the
Choice of Law Between the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Hague Evidence
Convention, 10 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 1 (1988).
76. See M. MANN AND J. MARl, DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES
LAW ENFORCEMENT 73 (1989).
77. Some of the largest insider trading cases in the Commission's history have been
successfully settled as a result of informal, yet responsible, diplomatic initiatives. Perhaps
the most notorious case is the action brought against Dennis Levine which ultimately
resulted in successful actions being brought against Ivan F. Boesky, Michael R. Milken,
and the investment banking firm of Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc. In SEC v. Levine, 86
Civ. 3726 (S.D.N.Y 1986), Bank Lue International, Ltd., a Swiss financial institution
located in the Bahamas, initially refused to disclose Levine's identity and trading activities,
arguing that, under Bahamian law, such a disclosure would subject the bank to criminal
penalties. The bank, however, turned over the information after the SEC provided it with
written assurances from the Bahamian Attorney General that the securities transactions
effected through it were not banking transactions and, therefore, not subject to prosecution
under Bahamian law. The written assurances from the Bahamian Attorney General were
secured through informal diplomatic channels.
78. See M. MANN AND J. MARl, DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES
LAW ENFORCEMENT 61 (1989).
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The regulatory authorities which enter into MOUs usually share
the common goal of integrity in the transnational securities markets. An MOU provides for the sharing of information and assurances of cooperation between the SEC and its respective foreign
counterpart. Specifically, this arrangement formalizes the methods
to request and provide information in connection with international
efforts to administer and enforce securities laws. 9
To date, the SEC has entered into five MOUs. These include
agreements with Switzerland; 0 with the United Kingdom8 1 Department of Trade and Industry; with the Japanese Ministry of Finance; with the securities commissions of the Canadian provinces
of Ontario, Quebec and British Columbia; and with the Brazil
Comissao de Valores Mobiliarios. 2 It is important to note that,
unlike the bilateral treaties discussed above, MOUs do not require
that the subject matter of the request involve offenses under the
laws of both countries.8 3 In effect, most MOUs provide the SEC
with direct access to information held by a counterpart in a foreign
country. This diplomatic approach for obtaining international
assistance usually results in the expeditious processing of an SEC
79. See id
80. The Swiss MOU is no longer in effect as its purpose vanished when the Swiss
insider trading law went into effect. See supra note 56. Nevertheless, bank secrecy remains
an integral part of the banking industry not only in Switzerland, but also in other civil law
countries; therefore, as elaborated throughout this Comment, a comprehensive historical
exploration of the "values" underlying the laws of financial privacy in civil and common
law countries is necessary in order to understand and overcome the barriers which keep
them apart, especially for the purpose of transnational discovery in complex cases of
financial fraud. For such an exploration, see Meyer, Swiss Banking Secrecy and Its Legal
Implications in the United States, 14 NEw ENG. L. REV. 18 (1978); Note, The Effect of
Swiss Bank Secrecy on the Enforcement of Insider Trading Regulations and the
Memorandum of UnderstandingBetween the Untied Statesand Switzerland, 7 B.C. INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 541 (1984); Comment, Swiss BankingSecrecy, 5 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.

128 (1966); Comment, The Conflict Between United States Securities Laws on Insider
Trading and Swiss Bank Secrecy, 7 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 318 (1985). For a discussion of
the recent progress in this area, see Capitani, Banking Secrecy Today, 10 U. PA. J. INT'L
Bus. L. 57 (1988).
81. For a recent and comprehensive discussion of the problems associated with the
enforcement of insider trading laws in Great Britain, see Comment, Recent Developments in
Insider Trading Laws and Problems of Enforcement in Great Britain, 12 B.C. INT'L &
CoMP. L. REV. 265 (1989).
82. See M. MANN AND J. MARl, DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL SECURMES
LAw ENFORCEMENT 74 (1989).

83. See Id
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evidentiary request.84
THE CANADIAN MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

The most comprehensive MOU entered into by the SEC to
date is the one with the Canadian provinces85 (hereinafter the Canadian MOU). It builds upon the SEC's previous experiences with
the Swiss and U.K. MOUs and provides that assistance will be
available in cases involving:
(i) insider trading;
(ii) misrepresentation of the use of fraudulent, deceptive or
manipulative practices in connection with the offer,
purchase or sale of any security;
(iii) the duties of persons to comply with periodic reporting
requirements or requirements relating to changes in corporate control;
(iv) the duties of persons, issuers, or investment businesses to
make full and fair disclosure of information relevant to
investors;
(v) the duties of investment businesses and securities processing businesses pertaining to both their financial, operational or other requirements and their duties of fair
dealing in the offer and sale of securities and execution of
transactions; and
(vi) the financial and other qualifications of those engaged in,
or in control of, issuers investment businesses or securities
processing businesses.8 6
Perhaps the most efficient aspect of the Canadian MOU is its
simplicity. All that a request for assistance must allege is that the
requesting authority is investigating to determine whether a violation of one of the foregoing subjects has occurred. After the required allegations are made, and providing that the information is
located within the jurisdiction of the other authority, assistance is
generally made available.
84. See Id.
85. Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States Securities and
Exchange Commission and the Ontario Securities Commission, the Commission de Valuers
Mobiliere du Quebec and the British Columbia Securities Commission, Jan. 7, 1988, 27
I.L.M. 412.

86. See id.

BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1:29

Prior to the implementation of MOUs, enforcement efforts
aimed at cross-border violations of securities laws had required the
voluntary cooperation of witnesses or the initiation of costly and
often time-consuming litigation. Regulatory authorities usually
were unable to compel witnesses located abroad to testify or even to
produce documents. However, under the Canadian MOU, securities regulators have agreed to investigate, using subpoena power
where necessary, in order to ensure that the requested information
87
is obtained.
If the SEC continues its diplomatic efforts and negotiates additional MOUs which are similar in scope to the Canadian MOU, the
enforcement and regulatory capabilities of the SEC will be immensely strengthened. The result will be increased confidence by
both institutional and individual investors in U.S. equity markets
as they will believe that securities laws are being equally applied.
History has demonstrated that this confidence is essential to strong,
stable, prosperous, and solid financial markets.8 8
V.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This Comment recommends diplomatic initiatives as the best
alternative for implementing internationally tolerable discovery
methods among countries with different theories of procedural justice. Moreover, this Comment suggests that greater cooperation
among regulatory agencies has developed because diplomatic efforts, rather than unilateral judicial actions, have facilitated the
evolution of the various systems of procedural justice. Furthermore, this Comment demonstrates that, despite inherent differences
in the procedural justice systems of sovereign nations, attitudes of
countries can beneficially evolve by more frequent use of diplomatic
channels.8 9
In addition, this Comment demonstrates that diplomatic initiatives provide the Commission with the most pragmatic alternative to the recurring conflicts that arise when it attempts to obtain
87. See M. MANN AND J. MARI, DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL SECURMES
LAW ENFORCEMENT 67 (1989).
88. See generally L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITEs REGULATION (1988).
89. Cf Hearings cited supra note I (statement by Harvey L. Pitt).
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foreign-based evidence. First, the evolution of the case law indicates that, without international agreements, the SEC would face
great uncertainty in its international discovery efforts. Second, the
experience of the SEC in procuring foreign-based evidence through
diplomatic initiatives demonstrates that the Commission is spared
considerable time and expense. Third, diplomatic negotiations resulted in the Commission's having successfully settled some of the
largest insider trading cases in its history.
Finally, this Comment demonstrates that the globalization of
the securities markets makes enforcement of federal securities laws
more complex. Barriers based on rigid notions of procedural justice are a severe impediment to obtaining foreign-based evidence.
However, this Comment proposes a solution. It suggests that international cooperation among securities regulatory authorities can
substantially improve the SEC's law enforcement efforts as well as
those of foreign nations. More importantly, this Comment recommends responsible diplomatic initiatives as the key to aligning the
conflicting values which keep sovereign nations apart.
R. BRIAN RIVERA-UNCAPHER

